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Continuing the critical analysis of ‘meaningful relationships’ in the context of the 
‘twin pillars’ 
By Donna Cooper* 
 
Abstract 
This article continues the critical analysis of ‘meaningful relationships’ in the context 
of the operation of the ‘twin pillars’ which underpin the parenting provisions. It will 
be argued that the attitude of judicial officers to three key questions influence how 
they interpret this concept and consequently apply the best interest considerations. 
Relevant to this discussion is an examination of the Full Court’s approach to the key 
parenting sections, particularly the interaction of the primary and additional 
considerations. Against this backdrop, a current proposal to amend the ‘twin pillars’ 
will be examined.  
 
Introduction 
This article continues the critical analysis of the concept ‘meaningful relationships’1 
in the context of the primary best interest parenting considerations.2 The primary 
considerations, first the benefit to the child of a meaningful relationship with both 
parents and second, the protection from abuse, neglect or family violence, have been 
described as the ‘twin pillars’ underpinning the parenting laws.3 These primary 
considerations are complemented by a second tier of best interest factors, known as 
the additional considerations, which collectively guide courts when make parenting 
orders in the best interests of children.4  
 
                                                 
* Donna Cooper is a Senior Lecturer in the Queensland University of Technology Law Faculty. She is 
also a family law consultant to Couper Geysen, a Brisbane law firm. The author would like to thank 
Belinda Fehlberg and the anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful feedback on an earlier version of 
this article. 
1 This critical analysis from a legal perspective was commenced in Z Rathus ‘How Judicial Officers are 
Applying New Part VII of the Family Law Act: A Guide to Application and Interpretation’ (2007) 
20(2) Australian Family Lawyer 5. It was then explored in a more detailed analysis in R Chisholm, 
‘The meaning of ‘meaningful’: Exploring a key term in the Family Law Act amendments of 2006’ 
(2008) 22 Australian Journal of Family Law 175. It has also been the subject of discussion in recent 
research, eg: R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand and L Qu, Evaluation of the 2006 
Family Law Reforms, Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2009, Chapter 15 at 347 - 350. 
2 The primary best interest considerations are contained in Family Law Act s60CC(2)(a).  
3 Mazorski and Albright [2007] FamCA 520 (31 May 2007) per Brown J at [3]. 
4 Family Law Act, s60CA. 
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Initially, the place of the primary considerations in the preferred approach of the Full 
Court of the Family Court to the key parenting sections will be examined. It will be 
argued that, although the legislation does not mandate the order in which the 
parenting sections should be dealt with, the Full Court has now provided clear 
guidance in this regard. The central principle being, in the legislative pathway to 
arrive at parenting orders, that the court must firstly examine the section 60CC best 
interest factors, before considering the section 61DA presumption of shared parental 
responsibility.5 The interaction of the primary and additional considerations will then 
be explored. 
 
The focus of the article will then turn to a discussion of ‘meaningful relationships’. 
This notion will be examined in light of case law and the body of social science 
research that allows us a window into the perspectives of children. An analysis will 
reveal that its meaning turns on the attitude of judicial officers to three key questions. 
First, whether the enquiry about the benefit to a child of a meaningful relationship is 
presumptive or evaluative. Second, whether the relevant time-frame for the 
examination of the relationship involves the past, the present or the future. Third, 
whether priority should be accorded to the quantity of time or to the quality of the 
relationship when courts are making decisions as to how best promote meaningful 
relationships. The attitude of judicial officers to these questions may influence the 
priority they accord to each of the primary considerations. It may also impact on their 
final decision. In view of this, a current proposal to amend the ‘twin pillars’ will be 
examined.6 
 
 
How the key sections of the legislation interact  
When family courts are making decisions in parenting matters, the key sections of the 
Family Law Act are 60B, 60CA, 60CC, and 65D(1), 61DA and 65DAA.  Since the 
2006 amendments, judicial officers have taken a variety of approaches to these 
                                                 
5 Taylor and Barker (2007) FLC 93-345 at [62-63]. 
6 This proposed amendment is contained in Family Law Amendment (Family Violence) Bill 2010 
(Cth): Exposure Draft http://www.ag.gov.au/familyviolencebill viewed 16 February 2011. Note that 
public consultation on this Draft is now closed as the final date for submissions was 14 January 2011. 
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sections.7 Rathus initially identified the preferred method of the Full Court8 being that 
the best interests of the child need to be discerned, including an examination of the 
relevant section 60CC factors, before going on to consider the section 61DA 
presumption.9  
 
The Full Court has stated that this sequence is recommended, not mandatory, and that 
‘a failure to follow what we see as a logical approach would not lead to an appealable 
error unless such error arose from a failure to give adequate reasons or to have regard 
to the matters which the legislation requires must be considered.’10 
 
In more recent times, this has become the accepted approach of the Full Court11 and is 
being followed in the majority of first instance decisions.12 The High Court, in 
considering the appeal in MRR v GR, also dealt with the sections in this order.13 It can 
be set out in a series of steps as follows: 
1. The section 60B objects and principles provide the context in which the court 
applies the following steps,  
2. The overriding principle is that, pursuant to s60CA, the best interests of the 
child are paramount;  
3. The court then looks to the s60CC best interest considerations. These are 
divided into a set of primary and additional considerations. The court must 
‘consider, weigh and assess the evidence’ on each of the relevant section 
60CC best interest considerations, and then ‘indicate’ the relative weight the 
court attaches to each of those matters, and how ‘all of those matters balance 
out’;14  
                                                 
7 Zoe Rathus, ‘How Judicial Officers are Applying New Part VII of the Family Law Act: A Guide to 
Application and Interpretation’ above n 1. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Taylor and Barker (2007) FLC 93-345 at [62-63]. 
10 Ibid at [62-63]. This approach was followed in subsequent Full Court decisions such as Starr and 
Duggan [2009] FamCA 115 at [38]. 
11 See also the Full Court decision in Starr & Duggan [2009] FamCA FC 115 at [38] and [39]. 
12 See for example Samworth and Grady [2010] FMCAfam 750 (3 August 2010); Tremper and Harpon 
[2010] FamCA 148 (2 March 2010). 
13 [2010] HCA 4 (3 March 2010). 
14 Collu and Rinaldo [2010] FamCA 53 at [345] referring to Smith and Smith (1994) FLC 92-488. See 
also Patrick, Australian Family Law in Context, Commentary and Materials, 4th ed, Lawbook Co, 
2009, Chapter 22 at 728 citing Smith [1994] FLC 92-488. 
 4
4. The power to make a parenting order is contained in section 65D(1), which 
states that the court can make such parenting order as it thinks proper, subject 
to sections 61DA and 65DAB;15  
5. The presumption of shared parental responsibility in section 61DA(1) is then 
considered and a determination made as to whether it applies, does not apply 
or is rebutted; 
6. If the presumption applies: 
a. The court must first consider section 65DAA(1) whether the child 
spending equal time with each parent will be in the child’s best 
interests and reasonably practicable16;  
b. If equal time is not appropriate the court must then consider whether 
spending substantial and significant time with each parent will be in 
the child’s best interests and reasonably practicable.  
7. If the presumption does not apply:  
the Court is at large to consider what arrangements will best promote the child’s 
interests, including, if the court considers it appropriate, an order that the child 
spend equal time or substantial and significant time with each of the parents.17  
 
 
This series of steps and in particular, the notion that the section 60CC factors should 
be considered before determining the presumption is now also the recommended 
approach in relocation cases.18 In Hepburn and Noble the Full Court of the Family 
Court made clear that the pre-2006 approach in relation to relocation as set out in the 
case A and A: Relocation case19 is no longer good law.20 
 
                                                 
15 It was stated in Goode and Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 at [10]: ‘The objects and principles contained 
in s60B provide the context in which the factors in s60CC are to be examined, weighed and applied in 
the individual case.’  
16 In MRR and GR [2010] HCA 4 the High Court made clear that the court had to consider both best 
interests AND reasonably practicability and that the court had no power to make an equal time order 
unless such an order was found to be reasonably practicable.  See R Chisholm and P Parkinson, 
‘Reasonable Practicability as a requirement: The High Court’s decision in MRR v GR’ (2010) 24 
Australian Journal of Family Law 255. 
17 Ibid at [65(10)]. 
18 Note that a similar approach is taken in interim hearings: Goode and Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 at 
[82]. 
19 (2000) FLC 93-035. 
20 See also Taylor and Barker (2007) FLC 93-345, Sealey and Archer [2008] FamCAFC 142, Starr and 
Duggan [2009] FamCAFC 115 and McCall and Clark (2009) FLC 93-405. 
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In summary, it is only after the section 60CC best interest factors have been fully 
considered that the court goes on to consider whether the s61DA presumption applies, 
does not apply or is rebutted. It is when considering the presumption that what may be 
termed as a ‘time trigger’ occurs as, if the presumption applies, the court must go on 
to section 65DAA and first, consider equal time and then second, consider substantial 
and significant time. 
 
The best interest factors are divided into two tiers, the ‘primary’ and ‘additional’ 
considerations and their interaction will now be examined. 
 
 
The ‘twin pillars’: how the primary considerations in section 60CC interact 
When working through the section 60CC best interest considerations, judicial officer 
have to decide in what order to deal with the primary and additional considerations. 
 
The primary considerations, contained in section 60CC(2), echo the first two objects 
and principles in section 60B: 
(a) the benefit of the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the 
child’s parents; and  
 
(b) the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from 
being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence. 
   
The additional considerations contain a long list of factors, including the views of 
children,21 the nature of relationships between children and parents,22 the capacity of 
parents and significant others to provide for children’s emotional and intellectual 
needs23 and exposure to family violence.24 
 
The primary considerations are clearly overarching and it was stated by the legislature 
that the reasoning behind the best interest factors being separated into two tiers was:  
 
...to elevate the importance of the primary factors and to better direct the court’s 
attention to the revised objects of Part VII of the Act which are set out in the new 
                                                 
21 Family Law Act, s60CC(3)(a). 
22 Family Law Act, s60CC(3)(b). 
23 Family Law Act, s60CC(3)(f). 
24 Family Law Act, s60CC(3)(j) and (k). 
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section 60B...25...There may be some instances where these secondary considerations 
may outweigh the primary considerations.26 
 
The Full Court in Marsden and Winch (No. 3) explained the way in which the 
considerations can be prioritised, stating that in that case the trial judge: 
...was obliged to place particular emphasis on the “primary considerations”. This is 
not only because the legislature has identified them as “primary” but also because 
they are manifestly of the utmost importance in determining what outcome will best 
advance a child’s best interests.27 
 
In first instance cases, there has been a divergence of approaches as to how the 
primary and additional considerations are applied. Some judicial officers have 
preferred to examine the primary considerations first and then go on to consider the 
additional considerations.28 Others have assessed the additional considerations at the 
outset so that they can be fully informed and in a better position to go back and make 
findings in relation to the primary.  
 
In the case of N and M, considered just after the 2006 amendments, Justice Rose took 
the latter approach and explained that in order to make findings in relation to the 
primary considerations he first had to make:  
findings in relation to one or more of the discrete matters that are described as 
“additional considerations” in order to be the substratum of facts or factual platform 
for the purpose of “the primary considerations”. For example, findings in relation to 
the nature of the relationship that a child has with each parent and the parental 
capacity of each of the parties to provide for the needs of the child are surely in a 
given case necessary factual findings for the purpose of reaching a conclusion 
regarding the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both 
parents.29  
 
Similar reasoning was applied by Stevenson J in Causer and Dibsdale, where 
parenting issues had to be determined in a case where there were allegations of family 
violence and emotional and physical abuse of a child. To work through the complex 
                                                 
25 Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental 
Responsibility) Bill 2005, Explanatory Memorandum at 13 [48]. 
26 Ibid at 13 [50]. 
27 [2007] FamCA 53 at [78]. 
28 For example, Davis and Spring [2007] FamCA 1149. 
29 N and M [2006] FamCA 958 at [35]. Referred to in Z Rathus, ‘How Judicial Officers are Applying 
New Part VII of the Family Law Act: A Guide to Application and Interpretation’ above n 1 at 6-7. 
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issues, her Honour chose to examine the additional considerations first, to inform her 
assessment of the primary.30 
 
In Mazorski and Albright Brown J also examined the additional considerations before 
dealing with the primary considerations.31 Brown’s reasoning was explicitly approved 
by Boland J sitting on the Full Court of Family Court in Moose and Moose.32 In the 
more recent case of Collu and Rinaldo, the Full Court followed this approach stating 
that there was some overlapping of the primary and additional considerations.33  The 
Full Court stated: 
It is for this reason that there is some attraction in the idea that perhaps the 
additional considerations in s60CC(3) should be looked at before consideration of 
that primary considerations in s60CC(2).”34  
 
This approach was approved and adopted in the subsequent Full Court case of Marvel 
and Marvel35 and is now being explicitly followed in some first instance decisions.36 
 
It is argued that this is the preferable order as it enables judicial officers to make a 
holistic assessment of the case before turning to examine the overarching primary 
considerations. It is also consistent with early guidance provided by Parkinson where 
he suggested that: 
it is through detailed examination of such additional considerations as may be 
relevant, that a judge may be assisted to determine the significance of the primary 
considerations and what orders to make.37  
 
                                                 
30 [2007] FamCA 739. 
31 (2007) 37 Fam LR 518 per Brown J. 
32 [2008] FamCA 108 at [73]. 
33 Family Law Act, s60CC(2)(b). 
34 Collu and Rinaldo [2010] FamCA 53 at [335] referring to Mazorski v Albright (2007) 37 Fam LR 
518 per Brown J. 
35 Marvel and Marvel [2010[FamCAFC 101 at [140]. 
36 For example by Faulks J in Marmara and Baccar [2010] FamCA 593 (16 July 2010); [100]; Clovelly 
and Clovelly (No.3) [2010] FamCA 684 (23 July 2010) at [22]. Also followed by O’Sullivan FM in 
Samworth and Grady [2010] FMCAfam 750 (3 August 2010) at [160]. Contrast with other recent first 
instance decisions where the primary considerations have been dealt with first, for example, Maine and 
Melton [2010] FMCAfam 396 (3 June 2010). 
37 Patrick Parkinson, Australian Family Law in Context, Commentary and Materials, 4th ed, Lawbook 
Co., 2009, Chapter 22: ‘Parenting Orders: General Principles’ above n 21 at 730. 
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This reasoning does not conflict with the original intention of Parliament, as when 
looking at the Explanatory Memorandum, the order in which the considerations 
should be worked through was not discussed.38  
 
The meaning of ‘benefit to the child of a meaningful relationship’ 
When examining the primary considerations, judicial officers are required to make 
findings as to whether parents have established meaningful relationships with their 
children. There is no explanation of the concept, ‘benefit to the child of having a 
meaningful relationship’ in the Family Law Act,39 however, courts, academic 
commentators and researchers have provided various interpretations.40  
 
Social scientists have also questioned how this term should be described, in terms of 
its various elements or in terms of ‘the overall experience (the sum of its parts)’?41 
Here it will be dissected into its various elements as an analysis of the case law 
reveals that its meaning turns on the attitude of judicial officers to three key questions:   
 
 
Question 1: Whether the enquiry is presumptive or evaluative?  
The first question is whether the enquiry as to whether a child will benefit from a 
meaningful relationship with a parent is a presumptive or evaluative one. Justice 
Bennett has clearly described this choice in the following terms: 
One possible interpretation is that the court must take the benefit to the child of 
having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents as a given – that is 
that there is a benefit to a child of having a significant relationship with both parents 
and the other factors have to be evaluated taking that matter into account. The second 
                                                 
38 Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental 
Responsibility) Bill 2005, Explanatory Memorandum at 13-18. See Godfrey and Sanders [2007] 
FamCA 102 at [30-39]. 
39 See the discussion by the Full Court of the Family Court in Moose and Moose [2008] FamCA108 62 
and 66-79. 
40 For a detailed analysis of the meaning of the term and the historical context, including the use of the 
term in previous case law see R Chisholm, ‘The meaning of ‘meaningful’: Exploring a key term in the 
Family Law Act amendments of 2006’ above n 1 and R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K 
Hand and L Qu, Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law Reforms, above n 1, Chapter 15, ‘The Application 
of the SPR Act 2006 Amendments to the Family Law Act 1975’ at 347-354. 
41 L Trinder, ‘What might children mean by a meaningful relationship?’(2009)15 Australian Journal of 
Family Studies 20 at 22. 
 9
possible interpretation is that the court must evaluate the nature and quality of the 
relationship to establish whether any “benefit” or meaningful relationship exists.42  
 
The first interpretation Bennett J offers can be described as a ‘presumptive’ enquiry, 
that is, the court assumes that the child will benefit from a relationship with the parent 
in question and that evidence will have to be presented to displace this.43  The second 
interpretation can be described as an ‘evaluative’ enquiry, that there is an onus on the 
parent seeking time to establish that it will result in a positive benefit to the child and 
evidence will have to be provided to support this.  
 
The way in which judicial officers’ conduct this enquiry clearly impacts on the level 
of evidence that must be presented and the manner in which it should be outlined. It 
may also impact on the way in which the two primary considerations are weighed 
against each other, and subsequently, the final decision. 
 
 
Whether the relevant time-frame involves past, present or future relationships? 
 
The next question concerns what time period the court should investigate when 
deciding whether a meaningful relationship has been established. Should the court 
look into both the past and present and assess the relationship between parents and 
children up to the date of hearing?  In the alternative, should judicial officers be 
purely future focused, considering whether children will benefit from meaningful 
relationships with their parents in the future? This question has been clearly described 
by Trinder in the following terms: 
is it only relationships with current importance and value that are meaningful or 
could relationships with the potential for future importance be seen as meaningful 
even if currently non-existent or unpromising.44 
 
 
The recent case law 
Recent case law sheds light on how judicial officers are approaching these two 
questions. It illustrates that generally courts assess whether there will be a benefit to 
                                                 
42 G and C [2006] FamCA 994 at [67-68]. 
43 McCall and Clark [2009] FamCAFC 92 at [118-120]. 
44 L Trinder, ‘What might children mean by a meaningful relationship?’ above n 41 at 22. 
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children in spending time with the parent in question and as such, make an evaluative 
enquiry.45  
 
Justice Benjamin has viewed this as involving two separate steps: 
1. Whether a meaningful relationship can be established and,  
2. If so, whether it is of benefit to the child.46 
 
The exercise involves assessing whether a ‘meaningful relationship’ has been 
established from the child’s perspective.  This is consistent with the wording of the 
sub-section being framed in terms of ‘the benefit to the child’.  Brown J emphasised 
this perspective in Mazorski and Albright stating that a meaningful relationship ‘is 
one which is important, significant and valuable to the child’.47 This was continued in 
Loddington and Derringford (No.2) where Cronin J stated that ‘for there to be a 
meaningful relationship, it must be healthy, worthwhile and advantageous to the 
child.’48 
 
Parenting cases often require judges to undertake a difficult balancing exercise 
between the two primary considerations. In such matters, judicial officers may have to 
decide whether to make orders that promote relationships between parents and 
children where there are safety or other concerns.  
 
In decisions where judicial officers are engaged in this balancing act, the factors 
proposed some time ago by Benjamin J in Cave and Cave are helpful and are 
particularly relevant.49 They can assist courts to assess whether there will be a benefit 
to a child in commencing or continuing a relationship with a parent. These factors are: 
 The attitude of the parent in question to the child, their primary carer and other 
significant persons in their lives; 
                                                 
45 For a discussion of this approach and further case law see R Chisholm, ‘The meaning of 
‘meaningful’: Exploring a key term in the Family Law Act amendments of 2006’ above n 1 at 185-186 
and 189; R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand and L Qu, Evaluation of the 2006 
Family Law Reforms, above n 1 at 347-350. 
46 Cave and Cave [2007] FamCA 860 (23 August 2007) at [101]. 
47 [2007] FamCA 520 at [26]. Cited in R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand and L Qu, 
Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law Reforms, above n 1 at 348. 
48 [2008] FamCA 925 at [169]. Cited in R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand and L Qu, 
Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law Reforms, above n 1 at 349. 
49 [2007] FamCA 860 
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 The general social behaviour of and the role model which would be provided 
for the children by the parent in question; 
 The personal disposition of the parent in question: that is, is he or she able to 
engage in a meaningful relationship with the children and for the benefit of the 
children; and  
 If orders are not made as sought by the parent, what would be missing from 
the lives of the children at present and into the future?50 
 
An evaluative enquiry can be contrasted with a presumptive enquiry51, taken, for 
example, by Murphy J in Runcorn and Raine.52 His Honour contended that: 
But, significantly, as it seems to me, the Act does not require a court to 
consider whether a party’s proposal is important, significant and valuable to 
a child. Rather, it appears to require the court to consider that such a 
relationship is of benefit to the subject children. Whilst not a “presumption” 
necessary to be rebutted (in the same sense as, for example, the express 
presumption as to equal shared parental responsibility), the paragraph 
appears to be presumptive in concept or effect.53 ‘ 
 
 
If a judicial officer conducts a presumptive enquiry, a finding will be made that the 
child will benefit from a meaningful relationship with the parent.  The judicial officer 
will then determine if there is any evidence that overturns this assumption and 
demonstrates that the child will not benefit from spending time with the parent in 
question.54 
 
It should be noted that in an earlier case of Marsden and Winch (No.3), the Full Court 
had rejected submissions by a father that the meaningful relationship consideration 
had a presumptive quality and that the trial judge should have explained ‘what factor 
                                                 
50 Ibid at [101]. Referred to in the discussion of ‘meaningful relationship’ in Z Rathus ‘How Judicial 
Officers are Applying New Part VII of the Family Law Act: A Guide to Application and Interpretation’ 
above n 1 at 8. 
51 This term ‘presumptive’ has been derived from R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand 
and L Qu, Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law Reforms above n 1 at 349 where the researchers 
described this decision as having a ‘presumptive quality’ at [347- 349]. 
52 (2008) FamCA 837. Referred to in R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand and L Qu, 
Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law Reforms above n 1 at 347-348. 
53 Ibid at [347]. 
54 See for example the approach of Murphy J in Harridge and Anor and Harridge [2010] FamCA 445 
[47-161]. 
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or factors combined to displace the primary consideration contained in 
section 60CC(2)(a)’.55 
 
Similarly, the Full Court in Champness and Hanson made clear that judicial officers 
should not be approaching cases from the perspective that they are required to make 
the orders most likely to lead to meaningful relationships between parents and 
children.56 The Full Court stated:  
The submissions of counsel for the father also appeared at times to be based 
on an assumption that it was obligatory for the trial Judge to make the orders 
most likely to ensure the children had a “meaningful relationship” with both 
parents. This is an incorrect assumption. The Court’s obligation is to make the 
orders most likely to promote the child’s best interests. In seeking to achieve 
that objective, s 60CC(2)(a) directs the Court to consider “the benefit to the 
child” of having a meaningful relationship with both parents. Even if such a 
benefit is established, it must still be weighed along with all of the other 
relevant factors. (See Bennett J’s analysis in G & C [2006] FamCA 994.) 57 
 
In relation to both of the above questions, the decision of the Full Court in McCall 
and Clark has provided more recent guidance. Three possible interpretations of 
‘benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship’ in section 60CC(2)(a) were 
offered: 
 
 (a) one interpretation is that the legislation requires a court to consider the benefit to 
the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents by 
examination of evidence of the nature of the child’s relationship at the date of the 
hearing, to make findings based on that evidence, which findings will be reflected in 
the orders ultimately made (“the present relationship approach”);  
(b) a second interpretation is that the legislature intended that a court should assume 
that there is a benefit to all children in having a meaningful relationship with both of 
their parents (“the presumption approach”); and  
(c) the third interpretation is that the court should consider and weigh the evidence at 
the date of the hearing and determine how, if it is in a child’s best interests, orders 
can be framed to ensure the particular child has a meaningful relationship with both 
parents (“the prospective approach”).58 
 
                                                 
55 Marsden and Winch (No. 3) [2007] FamCA 134 (21 November 2007) at [78]. Referred to in R 
Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand and L Qu, Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law 
Reforms, above n 1 at 349. 
56 [2009] FamCAFC 96 (3 June 2009). 
57 At [103]. 
58 At [118]. 
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The Full Court approved the interpretations of ‘meaningful relationship’ set out by 
Brown J in Mazorski and Albright and Bennett J in G and C.59 In doing so it 
condoned an evaluative enquiry stating that the investigation required ‘a court to 
focus on the benefit to the child of a meaningful or significant relationship’.60 
 
The Court also touched on those cases in which no positive benefit could be 
established stating: 
No doubt in the majority of cases there will be a positive benefit to the child of having 
a significant relationship with both parents, but there will also be some cases where 
there will be no positive benefit to be derived by a child by a court attempting to craft 
orders to foster a relationship with one parent if this would not be in the child’s best 
interests.61 
 
In this regard, the Full Court was alluding to the situation where, for example, time 
with a parent would prove an unacceptable risk to a child. 
 
In terms of the relevant time periods that should be examined when determining 
‘meaningful relationships’, the Full Court expressed a preference for a ‘prospective 
approach’, being a future focus.62 This echoes Bennett J in G and C who stated that: 
It is a prospective enquiry. I am required to evaluate the extent to which a meaningful 
or significant relationship with both of his parents is going to be beneficial and of 
advantage to B into the future.63 
 
However, the Full Court added that ‘depending on the factual circumstances, the 
present relationship approach may also be relevant.’ This required the court ‘to 
explore existing relationships between a child and his or her parents and other 
persons, including grandparents.’64 This follows decisions, such as G and C, where 
Bennett J looked into the past in addition to the future to assess the state of the 
relationship between the child and his father.65 Her Honour conducted this 
examination when considering the additional considerations, particularly when 
                                                 
59 [2009] FamCA 92 at 121. 
60 At [121-122]. 
61 At [121-122]. 
62 This has been applied in recent cases, for example, Donnelly and Baxter [2010] FMCAfam 1418 at 
[39-40]. 
63 [2006] Fam CA 994 at [72]. 
64 Ibid at [119]. 
65 At [99-106]. The child was seven and had not spent time with his father since he was three years of 
age. 
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assessing the nature of the child’s relationship with each of the parents and significant 
others.66 
 
It is argued that, it is difficult to think of a case in which the present relationship 
approach, being an examination of the nature of the child’s relationship with the 
parent up to the date of hearing, will not also be relevant. Even if the relationship 
between parent and child has been very limited, as was the case in both G and C and 
McCall, these factual circumstances and the reasons behind why contact has been 
non-existent or extremely limited, will still be relevant to the enquiry.67   
 
Whether priority should be accorded to the quantity or quality of time? 
In relation to the Full Court’s exposition of ‘meaningful relationship’ in McCall and 
Clark, a further concept, being the ‘nature of the relationship’ between parent and 
child can be examined in more detail.  The cases and social science literature 
highlight another important question, where a meaningful relationship between parent 
and child has been established and has been found to benefit the child, should the 
court focus on the ‘quality’ of the relationship or on the ‘quantity’ of time?  Or are 
these concepts of equal importance? 
This question has been particularly relevant in the context of relocation decisions 
where, if one parent is permitted to move, it will significantly reduce future time spent 
between the child and the other parent. For example, in Mazorski and Albright Brown 
J was of the view that a meaningful relationship ‘is a qualitative adjective, not a 
strictly quantitative one.68   
Kay J took a similar approach in Godfrey and Sanders and stated in the context of a 
proposed relocation that “...Even if the move results in a diminution in the quality of 
the relationship, what the legislation aspires to promote is a meaningful relationship, 
                                                 
66 Family Law Act, s60CC(3)(b). 
67 See for example Hutchinson and Hutchinson [2011] FamCA 27 where Austin J, applying the McCall 
prospective approach, stated that ‘the important consideration is whether the child will benefit from a 
meaningful relationship with the father in the future’. Austin J then continued: ‘the answer to that 
question is necessarily linked to the explanation for why the children’s relationships with their father 
have deteriorated’ at [111]. 
68 [2007] FamCA 520 at [26]. 
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not an optimal relationship.”69 In that case Kay J allowed an appeal and permitted the 
mother to move from country Victoria to Brisbane, resulting in a substantial decrease 
in the children’s time with their father. 
In Blair and Blair Mr Justice Le Poer Trench spoke of ‘meaningful relationship’ in 
terms of both quantity and quality: 
The term ‘meaningful relationship’ may potentially refer to the time the parents can 
spend exercising their relationship with their children. It could refer to the quality of 
the parental relationship or to both those aspects. It could be considered from the 
child’s point of view or alternately from the parents’ point of view. In the absence of 
any limiting suggestion in the section I think the best approach is to give the term all 
its possible relevant meanings and interpret it broadly rather than narrowly . . .70 
 
Murphy J has also referred to time being a factor and in Runcorn and Raine suggested 
that “quantity of time is an element of a meaningful relationship but not necessarily 
determinative of it”71. 
 
It is clear, however, that the current parenting provisions provide links between, 
‘meaningful relationships’ and quantities of time.  Although the primary 
considerations don’t automatically trigger considerations of parcels of time, a ‘time 
trigger’ occurs if the section 61DA presumption applies and the court then has to 
work its way through section 65DAA.72 The historical background to the 2006 
amendments reveals discussions about ‘meaningful relationships’ consisting of 
‘substantial and significant time’73 with children.74 This sought to avoid the situation 
                                                 
69 (2007) 208 FLR 287 at [36]. 
70 Blair and Blair [2007] FamCA 253 per Le Poer Trench J at [108]. 
71[2008] FamCA 837at [45]. Referred to in R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand and L 
Qu, Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law Reforms, above n 1 at 348. 
72 The court then has to consider first, whether according to s 65DAA(1) the child spending equal time 
with each parent would be in the child’s best interests and reasonably practicable.  If equal time is not 
appropriate, the court then has to consider, pursuant to s 65DAA(3), whether substantial and significant 
time would be appropriate. 
73 The term, ‘substantial and significant time’ is defined in Family Law Act, s65DAA(3) and means that 
a child should spend time with the parent on week days and days that fall on weekends and holidays, 
allowing the parent to be involved in both the child’s daily routine and significant events. 
74 For a more detailed discussion of this historical background to the legislation see R Chisholm, ‘The 
meaning of ‘meaningful’: Exploring a key term in the Family Law Act amendments of 2006’above n 1 
at 180-183. 
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where parents, often fathers, had only a visiting relationship with their children.75 For 
example, in the Explanatory Memorandum it was said that:  
What is important is that the focus be on ways that both parents are able to develop a 
meaningful relationship with their children and share important events including 
everyday time with the child. It recognises that in order to have a meaningful 
involvement and to share equal shared parental responsibility that this will generally 
involve both parents spending both substantial and significant time with their 
children…76 
 
The body of social science research now confirms that, from children’s perspectives, 
both the quantity and quality of time with parents is important. However, it is the 
quality of the relationship that is the higher level concern.77 In a recent report, it was 
concluded: 
The consistent conclusion emerging from the research on contact and shared 
parenting is that what matters most to children is the quality of their relationship with 
their parents, not the amount of time per se.78 
 
The researchers highlighted, that where relationships are positive, the more time spent 
together the more meaningful a relationship can become.79 This study indicated that a 
positive relationship can be fostered when parents take an active interest in children, 
ensure their home is welcoming and are engaged with their children’s lives and 
interests.80 It was also clear that, for some children, the quantity of time impacted on 
their perception of the quality of the relationship. The researchers related that ‘Some 
children clearly equated their parent’s time and the amount of effort they made to see 
them as a marker of their parents’ love for them.’81  
 
The views of several social science commentators in this regard were summarised by 
Trinder as follows:  
                                                 
75 See particularly the submissions of Cashmore and Parkinson made to the Hull Committee cited in R 
Chisholm, ‘The meaning of ‘meaningful’: Exploring a key term in the Family Law Act amendments of 
2006’above n 1 at 179-180. 
76 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 
2005, Senate 27 March 2006 cited in R Chisholm, ‘The meaning of ‘meaningful’: Exploring a key term 
in the Family Law Act amendments of 2006’ above n 1 at 182.  
77 B Smyth, ‘A 5-year retrospective of post-separation shared care research in Australia’ (2009) 15 
Journal of Family Studies 36 at 43-45. 
78 Social Policy Research Centre, Shared Care Parenting Arrangements since the 2006 Family Law 
Reforms, May 2010 at 136 [5.17]. 
79 Social Policy Research Centre, Shared Care Parenting Arrangements since the 2006 Family Law 
Reforms ibid at page 115 [5.3]. 
80 Ibid at 123-137 
81 Social Policy Research Centre, Shared Care Parenting Arrangements since the 2006 Family Law 
Reforms above n 78 at 121 [5.8].   
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while quality is more important than quantity of involvement for child wellbeing, 
there has to be a minimum amount of time available to develop and sustain a quality 
relationship.82 
 
In contrast, for some families, where relationships are not positive, an increase in time 
can negatively impact on a relationship. For example, in earlier research from the 
United Kingdom an eleven year old boy, the subject of an equal time arrangement 
(imposed against his wishes), was described as being very unhappy. His father had 
been violent to him in the past and the boy was frightened of his father. When time 
with his father was reduced, the boy’s situation improved. In this case the researchers 
concluded: 
In this case it became clear that the quantity of time spent with a parent could reduce 
the quality of that relationship. Put simply: more does not necessarily mean better.83 
 
At this point it is interesting to note that Moloney has suggested that while lawyers 
and courts often conceptualise post-separation relationships in terms of parcels of 
time, children and social scientists tend to think of them in terms of emotional 
connectedness and parental attunement.84 This aligns with Chisholm’s assessment of 
the Hull Committee’s interpretation of ‘meaningful involvement’ as equating to 
‘caring involvement’.85 
 
In addition to this notion of ‘quality’ of time being measured in terms of positive 
experiences, there are indications in the research that, if parenting arrangements are 
imposed on older children against their wishes, they may form negative perceptions 
about time with parents.86 
 
                                                 
82 L Trinder, ‘What might children mean by a meaningful relationship?’ above n 41 at 22. 
83 C Smart, B Neale and A Wade, the changing experience of Childhood: Families and Divorce, Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 2001, Chapter 7, Children’s Experiences of Co-Parenting at 137-138. 
84 L Moloney, ‘‘Meaningful relationships’ in the Family Law Act amendments of 2006: A socio-legal 
perspective on fathers, mothers and the ‘sharing’ of care after separation’ (2009) 15 Journal of Family 
Studies 9 at 9 and 18. 
85 R Chisholm, ‘The meaning of ‘meaningful’: Exploring a key term in the Family Law Act 
amendments of 2006’ above n 1 at 180. ‘The Hull Committee’ was more formally known as the 
Parliament of Australia, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community 
Affairs, when conducting a ‘Child Custody inquiry’, their report being Every picture tells a story: 
Report on the inquiry into child custody arrangements in the event of family separation, December 
2003. 
86 Social Policy Research Centre, Shared Care Parenting Arrangements since the 2006 Family Law 
Reforms above n 78 at 124-127. 
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In earlier research carried out in the United Kingdom, Smart identified three factors 
which were found to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful shared care 
arrangements. These factors could be relevant to whether some children (particularly 
older children) perceive their relationships to be positive and therefore, ‘meaningful’: 
1. whether the arrangement was based on the needs and wishes of the parents or 
those of the children; 
2. whether the arrangements were flexible enough to accommodate changing 
needs and circumstances; and 
3. whether the children felt equally ‘at home’ in both of their parents’ homes.87 
 
Smart and other researchers also identified factors that meant, for their particular 
subject group, co-parenting had not been successful from the child’s point of view: 
 if the child was older, parents lived a distance from each other and the child 
was a long way from friends when with one parent; 
 if the child did not like one parent, 
 If the child was frightened of one parent, particularly where that parent had 
been violent to them in the past: 
 If one parent was trying to manipulate them; 
 If one parent was not supportive of the shared parenting arrangement88  
 
Similar types of findings have been made in more recent Australian research which 
acknowledged that children were most satisfied with their arrangements when their 
views had been listened to and they had flexibility to change arrangements, if 
needed.89 They are also consistent with findings that raised questions about the 
appropriateness of equal time or shared parenting arrangements for some families,90 
                                                 
87 C Smart, ‘Equal shares: rights for fathers or recognition for children?’(2004) 24(4) Critical Social 
Policy 484-503. Cited in Social Policy Research Centre, Shared Care Parenting Arrangements since 
the 2006 Family Law Reforms, above n 78 at 9. 
88 C Smart, B Neale and A Wade, the changing experience of Childhood: Families and Divorce, above 
n 83, Chapter 7, Children’s Experiences of Co-Parenting at 137-139. 
89 Social Policy Research Centre, Shared Care Parenting Arrangements since the 2006 Family Law 
Reforms, Chapter 5 above n 78; R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand and L Qu, 
Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law Reforms, above n 1, Chapters 7 and 11. 
90 See also the factors shown to be present in successful shared care arrangements in the reports: 
Australian Institute of Family Studies, B Smyth, L Qu and R Weston, Parent-child contact and post-
separation parenting arrangements, Chapter 9, ‘The demography of parent-child contact’ at 116-117; 
R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand and L Qu, Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law 
Reforms above n 1 at 168-169 
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where there was very high conflict between parents91 or issues of family violence and 
safety concerns.92  
 
It is also clear that ‘meaningful relationships’ can be conceptualised in different ways 
for different age groups and that what is ‘meaningful’ for young children may be 
totally different to the perceptions of teenagers. 93  
 
For example, some judicial officers have considered that ‘meaningful’ for very young 
children should be framed in terms of examining whether they have formed a primary 
attachment to one parent. They then focus on constructing parenting arrangements 
that do not disturb this secure attachment. In these instances, the quality of time and 
frequency of visits are viewed as being more important: 
In the case of very young children, it is not so much the time spent with the children 
but the gap between visits and the quality of time spent that is important.94 
 
This is consistent with recent research which highlights the importance of attachment 
for the well-being of very young children95 and the negative implications that may 
flow when this attachment is disturbed.96 
 
In terms of teenagers, their educational needs and the desire to socialise with peers 
will usually be important. In one study the researchers noted in relation to views 
expressed by children and young people as to their satisfaction with shared parenting 
arrangements:  
Views about the ease of arrangements at different ages differed. As indicated earlier, 
older adolescents indicated that they preferred to be in one place as they needed to 
concentrate more on studying in their senior years at high school.97  
                                                 
91 J McIntosh and Professor R Chisholm, ‘Shared Care and Children’s Best Interests in Conflicted 
Separation: A Cautionary Tale from Current Research’ (2007) 20(1) Australian Family Lawyer 3. 
92 R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand and L Qu, Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law 
Reforms, above n 1, Chapters 10 and 11. 
93 See for example Altobelli FM’s comments in M and K [2007] FMCAfam 26 at [48]. 
94 Loddington and Derringford (No.2) [2008] FamCA 925 at [176]. See also J McIntosh B Smyth, M 
Kelaher, Y Wells and C Long, Post-separation Parenting Arrangements and Developmental Outcomes 
for Infants and Children – Collected Reports (Family Transitions, 2010). 
95 J McIntosh and R Chisholm, ‘Shared Care and Children’s Best Interests in Conflicted Separation: A 
Cautionary Tale from Current Research’ above n 90 at 8. 
96 J McIntosh, B Smyth, M Kelaher, Y Wells and C Long, Post-separation Parenting Arrangements 
and Developmental Outcomes for Infants and Children—Collected Reports above n 93 at 9 and 156-
157. 
97 Social Policy Research Centre, Shared Care Parenting Arrangements since the 2006 Family Law 
Reforms, above n 78 at 120 and 131. 
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Balancing the two primary considerations: meaningful relationship and 
protection from harm and abuse 
Although the discussion in this article has focussed on section 60CC(2)(a) of the 
Family Law Act, being the meaningful relationship consideration, in many cases 
courts will have to weigh this factor against s60CC(2)(b), the protection from harm 
consideration. This can be a complicated exercise and there is no guidance in the Act 
at present as to which consideration should prevail. 
 
A recent review of the Family Law Act in the context of family violence was 
conducted by Professor Chisholm.98 The resultant report concludes that the operation 
of the ‘twin pillars’ has proved problematic, as the ‘artificial prominence given to the 
two factors under the present law seems to reflect ideas about parental entitlements’.99 
Chisholm relates that this, combined with a misapprehension in the general 
community that rights to equal shared parental responsibility convey rights to equal 
time arrangements, have meant that a perception has formed that ‘spending equal time 
with the child is the right of a parent, forfeited only if the parent has been violent or 
abusive.’100  
 
Chisholm argues that this focus on parental entitlements, in the absence of violence 
and abuse, has also led to certain factual circumstances, such as parental neglect, not 
being accorded as much importance as they deserve. Chisholm argues that: 
The ‘twin pillars’ formula is not an ideal guide to children’s best interests. Good 
parenting may be compromised by other things in addition to violence and abuse. A 
parent may be disabled from responding properly to a child’s needs by reason of 
adverse mental health, or physical health.  A parent may be indifferent to a child, and 
leave a child unattended for long periods; or seriously neglect a child...101 
 
                                                 
98 Professor R Chisholm, Family Violence Review, 27 November 2009 
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Families_FamilyCourtsViolenceReview viewed 16 
February 2011. 
99 Ibid at 8-9. For a critical discussion of social science research and how it is used in family law 
decision-making see Z Rathus, ‘Social Science or ‘Lego-Science’ Presumptions, Politics, Parenting and 
the New Family Law’(2010) 10(2) Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 164. 
100 Ibid at 9.  See also R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand, L Qu, ‘The Australian 
Institute of Family Studies Evaluation of the 2006 family law reforms: Key findings (2010) 24 
Australian Journal of Family Law 5 at 6 and 16-20. 
101 Ibid at 127-128.  
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Recent research lends support to these concerns. It highlights that, in some families, 
shared parenting arrangements102 have either been voluntarily entered into or awarded 
by courts and are not working well for children, for example, where there are issues of 
violence and safety concerns,103 high conflict between parents104 or where there are 
very young children.105 Several years ago McIntosh and Chisholm raised concerns 
about the appropriateness of shared parenting arrangements for children where parents 
are in high conflict.106 More recent research conducted by McIntosh and colleagues 
indicates that such arrangements can escalate family conflict over a period of time and 
can be particularly detrimental for very young children.107   
 
In response, there is currently an Exposure Draft Bill proposing amendments to the 
primary considerations and a range of other sections in the Family Law Act108 to 
address concerns where families have experienced family violence or abuse.109 If 
adopted, a further sub-section 2A would be inserted into section 60CC.  The new sub-
section states that ‘If there is any inconsistency in applying the considerations’ the 
court is to give greater weight to the protection from harm factor.110 
 
                                                 
102 Shared care time arrangements have been described as being children spending 35-65% of nights 
with each parent, R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand and L Qu, Evaluation of the 
2006 Family Law Reforms above n 1 at 168. 
103 R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand and L Qu, Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law 
Reforms above n 1 at 273. 
104 J McIntosh and Professor R Chisholm, ‘Shared Care and Children’s Best Interests in Conflicted 
Separation: A Cautionary Tale from Current Research’ above n 90; Social Policy Research Centre, 
Shared Care Parenting Arrangements since the 2006 Family Law Reforms above n 78 at xi-xii. 
105 J McIntosh, B Smyth, M Kelaher, Y Wells and C Long, Post-separation Parenting Arrangements 
and Developmental Outcomes for Infants and Children – Collected Reports above n 93 at 9 and 156-
157. For an analysis of the relevant social science research see A Harland, D Cooper, Z Rathus and R 
Alexander and R Hyams, Family Law Principles, Lawbook Co. (forthcoming) in Chapter 11: ‘The 
Role of Social Science Research and Other Discplines in Family Law’. 
106 J McIntosh and Professor R Chisholm, ‘Shared Care and Children’s Best Interests in Conflicted 
Separation: A Cautionary Tale from Current Research’ above n 90. Note that for the purposes of this 
research ‘substantially shared care’ was defined as a minimum of a 5:9 ratio (on average, a minimum 
of five nights with each parent, spread over an average fortnight), see footnote 3 at 15. 
107 J McIntosh, B Smyth, M Kelaher, Y Wells and C Long, Post-separation Parenting Arrangements 
and Developmental Outcomes for Infants and Children – Collected Reports above n 93. There were 
particular concerns for children under four in shared parenting arrangements, see pp9 and 156-157. 
108 Note that there are a host of other amendments proposed to Family Law Act, including to the 
additional considerations in s60CC, see Professor R Chisholm, Family Violence Review above n 98 at 
132-150. 
109 Family Law Amendment (Family Violence) Bill 2010: Exposure Draft above n 6. 
110 See also Family Law Amendment (Family Violence) Bill 2010, Consultation Paper at 3. See 
Family Law Amendment (Family Violence) Bill 2010, Consultation Paper at 30-33. Note that one of 
the other many proposed amendments to the Family Law Act is to widen the definition of ‘abuse’ in 
relation to children to include ‘serious neglect of the child’( at 3). 
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The amended section 60CC would read as follows:  
 
60CC How a court determines what is in a child’s best interests  
 
Determining child’s best interests  
 
(1) Subject to subsection (5), in determining what is in the child’s best interests, the 
court must consider the matters set out in subsections (2) and (3).  
Primary considerations  
(2) The primary considerations are:  
(a) the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s 
parents; and  
(b) the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being 
subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.  
Note: Making these considerations the primary ones is consistent with the objects of 
this Part set out in paragraphs 60B(1)(a) and (b).  
 
(2A) If there is any inconsistency in applying the considerations set out in 
subsection (2), the court is to give greater weight to the consideration set out in 
paragraph (2)(b). 
 
This was not the preferred option of Chisholm, in terms of his proposed amendments 
to the Family Law Act.  His preference was to amend the section 60CC factors more 
broadly to remove the two tiers and allow courts to deal with the best interest factors 
in terms of their relevance, rather than allocating any priority to particular factors.111 
Chisholm’s second preference was to amend section 60CC(2) to build up the 
protection from harm consideration to make it ‘as tall as’ the meaningful relationship 
consideration.112 This was based on findings that the meaningful relationship 
consideration was currently being accorded greater weight than the protection from 
harm factor113 and that ‘the appropriate correction is to build up the second to make it 
as tall as the first’.114  
 
However, it is not clear that the current proposed amendment would achieve this 
objective. The wording in terms of an ‘inconsistency’ imports the potential for further 
confusion as there is no clarification as to when an inconsistency may occur. The 
                                                 
111 Professor R Chisholm, Family Violence Review above n 98 at 8-9, 132-136. This was the situation 
prior to the 2006 amendments when section 68F simply contained a list of ‘best interest factors’. 
112 Ibid at 130. 
113 For further evidence of this see R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand, L Qu, ‘The 
Australian Institute of Family Studies Evaluation of the 2006 family law reforms: Key findings above n 
100 at 25. 
114 Professor R Chisholm, Family Violence Review above n 98 at 130. 
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question then becomes: when will an ‘inconsistency’ arise when applying the primary 
considerations?  
 
It is argued that preferable wording for this section would be: 
(2A) That when applying the considerations set out in subsection (2), the court is to 
give greater weight to the consideration set out in paragraph (2)(b). 
 
This would be consistent with pronouncements of the Full Court stating that, in some 
cases, the need to protect a child from harm will outweigh the meaningful relationship 
consideration:  
Not only must the “additional” considerations be taken into account, but the two 
“primary” considerations themselves may tend in different directions. That is to say, 
whilst there may be great benefit attached to a particular child having a meaningful 
relationship with both parents, that benefit may be outweighed by the need to protect 
that particular child from physical or psychological harm associated with 
maintaining such a relationship.115 
 
 
This would also address concerns, such as those expressed by Rathus,116 that some 
judicial officers are taking a purely prospective approach to their assessment of 
‘meaningful relationships’117and as a result may not prepared to take into account the 
impact on children of family violence that occurred prior to separation, when 
constructing future parenting arrangements.118 In such cases Rathus argues that 
judicial officers may not find any ‘inconsistency’ when applying the primary 
considerations as the violence has ceased and may be regarded as no longer relevant. 
According to the current proposed amendment judicial officers would have no 
obligation to prioritise protection from harm in such instances.119  
 
The following case example highlights the ambiguities that may arise with the use of 
the word, ‘inconsistency’.  
 
                                                 
115 Marsden and Winch (No. 3) [2007] FamCA 1364 at 77. 
116 These concerns are set out in Z Rathus, Submission on Exposure Draft: Family Law Amendment 
(Family Violence) Bill 2010 Consultation Paper at 17-19. 
117 A case example given by Rathus is Pilcher & Schneider [2007] FMCAfam 1163 [at 17-18 of the 
Submission]. 
118 This is because in the particular types of cases that Rathus describes, the family violence was 
perpetrated by one spouse on another during the relationship, but ceased at separation. 
119 See Z Rathus, Submission on Exposure Draft: Family Law Amendment (Family Violence) Bill 2010 
Consultation Paper at 19. Section 60CC(2)(b) covers protection from psychological as well as physical 
harm and protection from being exposed to ‘abuse, neglect or family violence’. 
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The case of Harridge and Harridge was considered by Murphy J, the Magellan judge, 
in the Brisbane Family Court.120 This case concerned whether two young boys, aged 
six and five, should spend time with their father. The main issue was whether there 
was an unacceptable risk of harm to the children in their father’s care as he had 
previously served a prison term for offences involving child pornography. In 
sentencing the father, the criminal judge had described the child exploitation material 
as being ‘of the most base depravity’.121 
 
The independent children’s lawyer (‘ICL’) proposed that the father not spend face to 
face time with the children until he had completed a sex offender’s programme, which 
was also a condition of his parole. The family report writer was of the same view.122 
The father proposed that he spend supervised time with the children and put forward 
several supervisors, including his parents. The ICL opposed supervision by the 
grandparents as it was considered that they had not accepted the serious nature of their 
son’s offences and would not perform their supervision duties adequately. The father 
was precluded from spending time with the children at a Contact Centre as he was a 
convicted sex offender and the rules of such Centres precluded his attendance.  
 
This case involved the trial judge in a very difficult balancing exercise between the 
primary considerations. His Honour conducted a presumptive enquiry as to whether a 
meaningful relationship had been established.123 Having made a finding that the 
children would benefit from a meaningful relationship with their father, Murphy J 
then made a very detailed assessment as to whether there would be an unacceptable 
risk of harm to the children in spending time with their father. His Honour described 
this exercise as evaluating, ‘does the potential for harm - or any “unacceptable risk” 
of harm – justify impinging upon the present, and potential, meaningful relationship 
otherwise identified and, if so, to what extent?’124 This illustrates the nature of a 
presumptive enquiry, as it was assumed that time with their father would benefit the 
children and that evidence would be needed to displace this. 
 
                                                 
120 [2010] FamCA 445. 
121 At [2]. 
122 The father had commenced a program but had discontinued his attendance and therefore had not 
completed such a program at the time of the hearing. 
123 At [47-49]. 
124 At [52]. 
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In this case there was no evidence that the father had behaved inappropriately towards 
the children in the past, however, due to the nature of his offences and his personality 
he was assessed by experts to be ‘at “low risk” of committing a contact sexual offence 
and at “moderate risk” of recidivism’.125  
 
Murphy J decided that the father was at low risk of offending against his own two 
children and decided that the best solution was to draft orders that in his view 
precluded any risk of harm.126 The orders provided for daytime contact only, 
supervised by the grandparents and to be overseen by a family consultant pursuant to 
section 65L. 
 
If we apply the new section 60CC(2A) to the facts of Harridge, it is difficult to 
discern whether the judicial officer would have viewed that there was any 
‘inconsistency’ in applying the two primary considerations. Particularly when making 
a presumptive enquiry, the assumption that the children will benefit from a 
meaningful relationship with their father is made at the outset and the exercise then 
shifts to an examination of whether there is evidence to displace this.  
 
If in the alternative, the judicial officer in Harridge had undertaken an evaluative 
enquiry, this would have involved a two-step process:  
1. Whether a meaningful relationship can be established and,  
3. If so, whether it is of benefit to the child.127 
A distinguishing feature of this type of enquiry is that, when making this initial 
assessment, the judicial officer would usually be assessing ‘unacceptable risk’ during 
the assessment of ‘meaningful relationship’. This may mean that an ‘inconsistency’ 
would be found when applying the primary considerations, however, again it is not 
clear that this would be the case.  
 
It is argued that the suggested amendment to proposed section 60CC(2A) that 
specifically requires judicial officers to elevate and prioritise the protection from harm 
                                                 
125 [85]. 
126 [96]. 
127 Cave and Cave [2007] FamCA 860 (23 August 2007) at [101]. 
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consideration is preferable to the current proposed amendment as it provides clearer 
guidance and less room for uncertainties and ambiguities.  
 
Further, although there is not time in this article to discuss the other proposed 
amendments to the Family Law Act in the Exposure Draft Bill, they clearly overlook a 
key concern outlined in Chisholm’s report. This concern was that the section 61DA 
presumption and its link, in certain circumstances, to considering packages of time128 
has led to perceptions of parental entitlements and inappropriate parenting 
arrangements being implemented, in some families.129 Chisholm recommended that 
the wording of section 61DA be amended to create a presumption in favour of each 
parent having ‘parental responsibility’ and that section 65DAA be repealed so that 
courts no longer have obligations to consider specific time arrangements.130 
 
Implications 
This discussion has highlighted the divergence in approaches of judicial officers to the 
operation of the ‘twin pillars’.131 The view expressed in this article is that the 
additional should be examined before the primary considerations. This is because an 
examination of the additional considerations, including factors such as the views of 
children132, the nature of their relationships with parents,133 the attitudes of parents to 
their responsibilities134 and any family violence135 will usually be required before 
making findings in relation to the primary considerations.  
 
This analysis has also revealed that there are two distinct ways in which enquiries can 
be conducted into assessments of ‘meaningful relationships’. In recent times, the Full 
Court of the Family Court has indicated a preference for an evaluative enquiry. This 
requires judicial officers to determine whether a meaningful relationship can be 
established and if so, whether it can be of benefit to the child.  
                                                 
128 Where the s61DA presumption applies and the court then has to go on and consider first equal time 
and second, substantial and significant time arrangements pursuant to Family Law Act, s65DAA. 
129 Professor R Chisholm, Family Violence Review above n 98 at 8-9, 125-130. 
130 Ibid at 132-136.  
131 For an early discussion of this divergence of approaches see Z Rathus ‘How Judicial Officers are 
Applying New Part VII of the Family Law Act: A Guide to Application and Interpretation’ above n 1. 
132 Family Law Act, s60CC(3)(a). 
133 Family Law Act, s60CC(3)(b). 
134 Family Law Act, s60CC(3)(i). 
135 Family Law Act, s60CC(3)(j) and (k). 
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In terms of relevant time periods, the Full Court has expressed a preference for a 
‘prospective approach’ to these assessments. This involves, if it is in a child’s best 
interests, examining how orders can be framed to promote a meaningful relationship 
with both parents in the future. However, it has indicated that, in making these 
determinations, judicial officers will often need to also use the ‘present relationship 
approach’ and look into the past and present, in addition to the future. It is argued that 
both the ‘present relationship’ and ‘prospective’ approaches will always be relevant. 
As Altobelli FM has pointed out, the concept of ‘meaningful relationship’ takes into 
account, ‘the history and quality of the relationship between parent and child, and the 
quality of parenting. The past and present are often the only reliable indicators of the 
future’.136 Particularly where issues of unacceptable risk are being assessed, it is the 
view expressed here that looking into the past is crucial to ensuring the safety and 
wellbeing of children. 
 
When framing parenting arrangements to promote ‘meaningful relationships’, an 
examination of the case law and social science research has demonstrated that both 
the quantity of time and the quality of relationships between children and parents are 
important but that, in some cases, quality may have to be prioritised. Children’s ages 
and developmental needs are relevant, in addition to logistical factors such as the 
geographic distances between parents. Although in many instances more time will 
benefit children, in some cases shorter periods of time may be desirable, for example, 
where children are very young and have attachments to primary carers or where there 
are risks to children and their safety needs to be prioritised.  
 
The recent proposed amendment to section 60CC(2) has been a response to concerns 
that the ‘twin pillars’ have led to perceptions of parental entitlements. Chisholm’s 
review and recent research findings have highlighted that the promotion of 
‘meaningful relationships’ has at times prevailed over promoting and protecting 
children’s interests. Research suggests that this, combined with community 
                                                 
136 M and K [2007] FMCAfam 26 at [48]. Referred to in Z Rathus ‘How Judicial Officers are Applying 
New Part VII of the Family Law Act: A Guide to Application and 
 Interpretation’ above n 1 at 9. 
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perceptions that the presumption equates to rights to equal time, has led some families 
to parenting arrangements that are not in children’s best interests.  
 
Clearer legislative guidance could only be of benefit and result in greater consistency 
in decision-making. It is argued that the amendment proposed in this article to elevate 
the protection from harm consideration would provide a further safety net to ensure 
that future parenting decisions promote the welfare of children.  
 
 
THE END 
